I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles.
I am currently on the job market, and have attended the AEA/AFA meeting in San Francisco in January, 2016
- Industrial Organization
- Applied Game Theory
- Financial Economics
Department of Economics,
8283 Bunche Hall
University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095
Phone: (310) 994-7528
Job Market Paper
Search Friction in Crowdfunding Market
This paper studies how search frictions affect price competition and funding allocation in the crowdfunding market theoretically and empirically. I develop a dynamic many-to-one matching model with fixed sample search, a la Burdett and Judd (1983) and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in setting interest rates in unique stationary equilibrium. Empirically, by documenting a novel data on a large panel of fundraisers’ behaviors, I find persistent rate dispersion and funding mismatches, which is consistent with theoretical predictions induced by search friction. More importantly, model implies that in a many-to-one matching market, price dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates investor coordination and hence improves matching efficiency compared with that in a random matching environment. According to a non-parametric estimation, I find that with dispersed rates, coordination effect can improve aggregate funding probability by 28% compared with random matching situation.