I am an assitant professor at School of Economics and Wang Yanan Institute for Studies of Economics, Xiamen University. Welcome to my personal website.
- Industrial Organization
- Applied Game Theory
- Financial Economics
- Ph.D. in Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, 2016
- Bechalor in Economics, the University of Hong Kong, 2010
Search Friction in Crowdfunding Market
This paper studies how search frictions affect price competition and funding allocation in the crowdfunding market theoretically and empirically. I develop a dynamic many-to-one matching model with fixed sample search, a la Burdett and Judd (1983) and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in setting interest rates in unique stationary equilibrium. Empirically, by documenting a novel data on a large panel of fundraisers’ behaviors, I find persistent rate dispersion and funding mismatches, which is consistent with theoretical predictions induced by search friction. More importantly, model implies that in a many-to-one matching market, price dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates investor coordination and hence improves matching efficiency compared with that in a random matching environment. According to a non-parametric estimation, I find that with dispersed rates, coordination effect can improve aggregate funding probability by 28% compared with random matching situation.